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Insurance Company Interference in Personal
Injury Law Practice
Sheldon E. Baskin*
M ANY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL long have complained of allegedly
organized propaganda campaigns by insurance companies,
aimed at reducing jurors' sympathy for injured plaintiffs in per-
sonal injury suits. In 1953 the American Automobile Insurance
Company caused four advertisements to appear in Life'
magazine and The Saturday Evening Post.2 These advertise-
* B.A., in Political Science, Western Reserve Univ.; Third-year student,
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 Life Magazine, January 26 and March 9, 1953.
2 The Saturday Evening Post February 14 and March 28, 1953.
Each of the full page advertisements contained a dramatic photo oc-
cupying more than one half of the page and supplying the setting for a
printed message in the lower portion of the page.
Illustration I-The guarded closed door of a jury room.
"Casualty insurance companies have been losing an average of
eleven dollars on every hundred dollars of earned auto liability pre-
miums. More accidents are partly responsible. So are excessive jury
awards rendered by jurors who feel they can afford to be generous
with the rich insurance companies' money. Actually jurors who are
responsible for awards in excess of what is just and reasonable are
soaking you by raising insurance rates."
Illustration II-Picture of jurors taking the oath.
"But the Juror's Oath demands that jurors decide 'according to the
evidence.' Jurors sometimes forget this. Ruled by emotion rather than
facts, they arrive at unfounded or excessive awards. Verdicts occasion-
ally even higher than requested.
"These men and women may be scrupulously honest. But, as jurors,
they feel in their hearts that the injured person although he may have
caused the accident-is entitled to an award.
"Because insurance rates depend on claim costs, these honest jurors
cost millions of policy holders, including themselves, countless extra
dollars in premiums every year."
Illustration III-A picture of a woman with a puzzled expression at a
store counter, paying her grocery bill.
"Yes, Mrs. Jones, you pay for liability and damage suit verdicts
whether you are insured or not.
"Next time you serve on a jury, remember this: When you are
overly generous with an insurance company's money, you help in-
crease not only your own premiums, but also the cost of every article
and service you buy."
Illustration IV-A father confessing to his son, a senior in law school,
about his recent experience as a juror.
"As a businessman, I knew the woman involved in the trial was
legally at fault. She walked into a moving car. But she was a widow
with a child to support, and I felt certain that the driver of the car
was insured.
(Continued on next page)
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ments alleged that excessive awards by juries were raising in-
surance rates and the cost of living. It was emphatically stated
in a NACCA Law Journal that, this wanton and blatant attempt
by insurance carriers to interfere with the administration of jus-
tice has aroused the ire of lawyers and jurists nation-wide, and
must be stopped.3
The difficulties encountered in attempting to substantiate a
cause of action for wrongful interference with attorneys' pro-
fessional contractual relations have relegated members of the
Bar to discovering other ways of doing indirectly that which they
can not do directly. In People ex rel. Barton v. American Auto-
mobile Insurance Co.,4 a quo warranto proceeding was brought
to show cause why the corporate charter of the insurance com-
pany should not be revoked for interfering with the orderly ad-
ministration of justice. The court held that the advertisements
did not constitute a clear and present danger to the administra-
tion of justice, and that the maintenance of quo warranto pro-
ceedings infringed on the constitutional rights of the defendant,
and on appeal the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari. A Pennsylvania Court " held for the insurance com-
pany when a contempt action plus a prayer for injunctive relief
was instituted arising out of the aforementioned advertisements.
This decision was appealed to the federal courts, where it was af-
firmed. The net effect of these cases however, was a cessation of
further reproduction of these particular advertisements.6
(Continued from preceding page)
"The doctor said that the widow wouldn't be able to hold down a
steady job for at least a year, so we awarded her a healthy sum. After
all, the child must eat."
In the bottom right hand corner of each advertisement the following
notation set off by a rectangle appeared:
"Most claims for damages are legitimate and reasonable and are
amicably settled out of court. However, as jurors tend more and more
to give excessive awards in cases that do go to court, such valuations
are regarded as establishing the 'going' rate for the day-to-day out-
of-court claims, all of which means increased premium cost to the
public."
3 11 NACCA L. J. 17 (May 1953).
4 People ex rel. Barton v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 317, 282 P.
2d 559, cert. den. 350 U. S. 886, 100 L. ed. 781, 76 S. Ct. 140 (1955).
5 Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38, aff'd 222 F. 2d 709 (CA 3d, 1955).
6 Wallace, Robert, Life and Limb, p. 212 (1955).
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Common Law
It is a general proposition of law that every man has the
right to engage in a lawful trade or calling, and to secure for
himself the earnings of his industry. This right is a property
right which the law protects by making actionable any unjusti-
fied interference therewith.- Interference may take many forms.
It may be interference with an existing contractual relation, or
with prospective advantage, or it may be the act of driving one's
competitor out of business. This paper will consider only inter-
ference with attorneys' professional contractual relations, and
explore the liability, if any, which may attach.
At common law, interference with contractual rights was
only actionable if a personal service contract was involved, and
then only if the interferer's actions were characterized by fraud,
coercion, intimidation, either actual or imminent, or by fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. In 1853, the leading case of Lumley v.
Gye,s was decided, in which what prior to then would have been
non-tortious modes of interference with contractual rights were
made actionable. At first this doctrine was received with hesita-
tion and disapproval, but within twenty eight years it was reaf-
firmed and became firmly established in English law.9 American
courts demonstrated more reluctance to accept the doctrine than
did the English courts. While at first recovery was denied un-
less the contract was for personal services, the courts eventually
shifted their emphasis to justification for the defendant's actions
rather than the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action. 10
Finally, in the case of Campbell v. Gates,1 the court declared
that intentional interference with contractual rights, in the ab-
7 Annot., 9 A. L. R. 2d 232 (1948).
s Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 706 (1853).
9 Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333, 50 L. J. Q. B. 305 (1881); Temperton v.
Russell, 1 Q. B. 715, 62 L. J. Q. B. 412 (1893) (applied to contracts other
than those for personal services); South Wales Miners' Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co., A. C. 239, 74 L. J. K. B. 525 (1905) (included inter-
ferences in which there was no ill will on the part of the defendant).
10 Ashley v. Dixon, 48 N. Y. 430, 8 Am. Rep. 559 (1872); Curran v. Galen,
152 N. Y. 33, 46 N. E. 297, 37 L. R. A. 802, 57 Am. St. Rep. 496 (1897) (re-
covery limited to contracts for personal services); Cumberland Glass Manu-
facturing Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 381, 87 A. 927, Ann. Cas. 1915 A. 702
(1913); National Protective Association of Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cum-
ming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369, 58 L. R. A. 135, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648
(1902); Roseneau v. Empire Circuit Co., 131 App. Div. 429, 115 N. Y. S.
511 (1909); S. C. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573 (1918);
Lamb v. Cheney & Sons, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920).
11 Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923).
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sence of privilege on the part of the inducer of the breach, was
actionable without reservation.
As an actionable tort the doctrine now is recognized in al-
most every state.12 In order to substantiate a cause of action
the courts have determined that four elements must be present: "3
(1) there must be a valid existing contract between the
plaintiff and the other contracting party; 14
(2) the defendant must have knowledge of that con-
tract; 15
(3) the defendant must have intentionally procured a
breach of the contract by the other contracting party; 16 and,
(4) there must be damage to the plaintiff. 17
Nature of Attorney-Client Contract
Respecting an attorney-client contract, the attorney is in a
more tenuous position than is the case with almost any other
kind of contracting party. An attorney-client contract is termi-
12 Mahoney v. Roberts, 86 Ark. 130, 110 S. W. 225 (1908); Hogue v. Sparks,
146 Ark. 174, 225 S. W. 291 (1920); Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n.,
115 F. Supp. 802, 810 (D. C. E. D. Ark., 1953); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176
Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924, 54 N. E. 524, 43 L. R. A. 797, 68 Am. St. Rep. 203(1898); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A.
405, 16 L. R. A. N. S. 746 (1908); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80
N. E. 817, 11 L. R. A. N. S. 201, 11 Ann. Cas. 332, 122 Am. St. Rep. 631(1907); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N. W. 754, 84
A. L. R. 35 (1927); Louis Kamm Inc. v. Flink, 113 N. J. L. 582, 175 A. 62,
99 A. L. R. 1 (1934); Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N. Y. 297, 49 N. E. 2d 146,
146 A. L. R. 1410 (1943); Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120 (W. D. Ark.
1960).
13 Lamb v. Cheney & Sons, supra note 10; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y.
443, 448, 173 N. E. 674, 675, 84 A. L. R. 1 (1930); Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co., 1 N. Y. 2d 116, 151 N. Y. S. 2d 1, 134 N. E. 2d 97 (1956); Neville v.
Waring, 192 N. Y. S. 2d 194 (1959).
14 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 55 L.
Ed. 502, 31 S. Ct. 376 (1911); Triangle Film Corp. v. Artcraft Pictures Corp.,
250 F. 981, 7 A. L. R. 303 (2 Cir., 1918) (conditions terminated); Bailey v.
Banister, 200 F. 2d 683 (10 Cir., 1952) (purchase of restricted Indian land);
Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n., 191 Ga. 366, 12 S. E. 2d 602, 132 A. L. R. 1165(1940) (usury); W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, 163 Mich. 12, 127 N. W.
803, 30 L. R. A. N. S. 327 (1910); Burden v. Elling State Bank, 76 Mont. 24,
245 P. 958, 46 A. L. R. 906 (1926) (contract declared forfeited); Rizika v.
Potter, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 372 (1947) (no contract).
15 R & W Hat Shop v. Sculley, 98 Conn. 1, 118 A. 55, 29 A. L. R. 551 (1922);
Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., supra note 12; Hornstein v. Podwitz,
supra note 13.
16 Cameron v. Barancik, 173 111. App. 23 (1912); Prosser, Law of Torts, 728
(2d ed., 1955).
17 Harmatz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 511 (1959).
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nable at will on one side,1 8 i.e., the client has an implied right
at any time to terminate the contract with or without cause. This
rule springs from the personal and confidential nature of the re-
lation.19 There is a conflict of authority as to whether a discharge
by a client without cause constitutes a breach of contract.20 The
18 Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524, 529, 45 Am. Rep. 263 (1883); Martin v.
Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916); Lawler v. Dunn, 145 Minn. 281,
176 N. W. 989 (1920); Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 21 A. 2d 396, 136 A. L. R.
226 (1941).
19 Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914, Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 536 (1912).
20 The majority of jurisdictions allow an attorney employed under a con-
tingent fee contract and discharged without fault on his part to recover
damages as for a breach of contract. U. S.: Such v. Bank of State, 121 F.
202 (1903 CC); Ark.: Brodie v. Watkins, 33 Ark. 545, 34 Am. Rep. 49
(1878); Weil v. Finneran, 70 Ark. 509, 69 S. W. 310 (1902); Weil v. Finneran,
78 Ark. 87, 93 S. W. 568 (1906); Cal.: Baldwin v. Bennett, 4 Cal. 392 (1854);
Bartlett v. Odd-Fellow's Saving Bank, 78 Cal. 218, 21 P. 743, 12 Am. St. Rep,
139 (1889); Kirk v. Culley, 202 Cal. 501, 261 P. 994 (1927); Elconin v.
Yalen, 208 Cal. 546, 282 P. 791 (1929); Zurich General Acci. & Liability Ins.
Co. v. Kinsler, 12 Cal. 2d 98, 81 P. 2d 913 (1938); Echlin v. Superior Ct., 13
Cal. 2d 368, 90 P. 2d 63, 124 A. L. R. 719 (1939); McCully v. Gans, 116 Cal.
App. 695, 3 P. 2d 348 (1931); Ind.: Scobey v. Ross, 5 Ind. 445 (1854); French
v. Cunningham, 149 Ind. 632, 49 N. E. 799 (1898); Ky.: Henry v. Vance,
111 Ky. 72, 63 S. W. 273 (1901); Minn.: Moyer v. Cantieny, 41 Minn. 242,
42 N. W. 1060 (1889); Mo.: McEllinney v. Kline, 6 Mo. App. 94 (1878);
N. Y.: Carlise v. Barnes, 102 App. Div. 573, 92 N. Y. S. 917 (1905); 183
N. Y. 567, 76 N. E. 1090 (1906) (appeal dismissed without opinion); N. D.:
Simmon v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 45 N. D. 251, 177 N. W. 107 (1920);
Ohio: Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N. E. 913, Ann. Cas.
1912 C. 737 (1911); Roberts v. Montgomery, 115 0. S. 502, 154 N. E. 740
(1926); Harrison v. Johnson, 640 App. 185, 28 N. E. 2d 615 (1940); Okla.:
White v. American Law Book Co., 106 Okla. 166, 233 P. 426 (1924); First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bassett, 183 Okla. 592, 83 P. 2d 837, 118 A. L. R.
1276 (1938); Or.: Dolph v. Speckart, 94 Or. 550, 186 P. 32 (1920); Pa.: Wil-
liams v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 282, 57 A. 578 (1904); Sundheim v. Beaver
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 140 Pa. Super. Ct. 529, 14 A. 2d 349 (1940);
Tenn.: Brownlow v. Payne, 2 Tenn. App. 154 (1925); Tex.: White v. Burch,
Tex. Civ. App. 19 S. W. 2d 404 (1929); Wash.: Romey v. Graves, 112 Wash.
88, 191 P. 801 (1920); Hamlin v. Case & Case, 188 Wash. 150, 61 P. 2d 1287
(1936); W. Va.: Palsley & Son v. Anderson, 7 W. Va. 212, 23 Am. Rep. 613
(1874); Clayton v. Martin, 108 W. Va. 571, 151 S. E. 855 (1930).
The trend however, has been to allow quantum meruit recovery as the
exclusive remedy.
U. S.: Spellman v. Banker's Trust Co., 6 F. 2d 799 (CCA 2d, 1925); Re
Badger, 9 F. 2d 560 (CCA 2d, 1925); Ky.: Breathitt Coal I & Lumber Co.
v. Gragory, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1507, 78 S. W. 148 (1904); Joseph v. Lapp, 25
Ky. L. Rep. 1875, 78 S. W. 1119 (1904); Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713,
218 S. W. 258 (1920); Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779, 70 S. W. 2d 671
(1934); Com. use of Clay County v. Sizemore, 269 Ky. 722, 108 S. W. 2d
733 (1937); Minn.: Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319, 283 N. W. 487 (1939);
Krippner v. Matz, 205 Minn. 497, 287 N. W. 19 (1939); N. Y.: Martin v.
Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46, L. R. A. 1917 F. 402 (1916), reh. den.
219 N. Y. 627, 114 N. E. 1072 (1917); Re Rosedale Ave., 219 N. Y. 192, 114
N. E. 49 (1916) reh. den. 219 N. Y. 626, 114 N. E. 1082 (1916); Re Krooks,
257 N. Y. 329, 178 N. E. 548 (1931); Tillman v. Komar, 259 N. Y. 133, 181
(Continued on next page)
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same conflict is prevalent in the case of a third party, not in
privity with the contract, inducing the client to terminate the
attorney-client relation. Some courts maintain that the termina-
tion of an attorney-client contract, by the client, either with or
without cause, is not a breach of contract. They reason that the
client has an implied right to terminate the contract at any time,
without liability other than quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of the services rendered by the attorney up to the time of
discharge. How then, they ask, can a third party, not in privity
with the attorney-client contract, incur liability for inducing the
client to do that which he is legally justified in doing on his own?
Generally it is held that where an attorney renders services
upon request, or is employed without any agreement as to his
fees, he is entitled only to reasonable compensation, measured
by the value of the services rendered up to the time of discharge.
Where, however, there is an existing contract as to the attorney's
fees, the attorney is entitled to the amount of compensation fixed
by the attorney-client contract, and a termination of the attorney's
services by the client does amount to a breach of contract.2 1
Insurance Companies and Contingent Fee Contracts
Insurance companies, in most personal injury cases, are in-
terested primarily in minimizing their losses. By effecting out-of-
court settlements they are generally able to reduce the amount
payable in a particular case, and at least to save the expense of
counsel fees.
Generally, insurance companies are privileged in their at-
tempts at direct settlement with the injured party, even if they
know of his retention of counsel.22 A Michigan court in 195123
(Continued from preceding page)
N. E. 75 (1932); Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 270 N. Y. 379,
1 N. E. 2d 472 (1936); Crowley v. Wolf, 281 N. Y. 59, 22 N. E. 2d 234, 121
A. L. R. 970 (1939); Martuci v. Brooklyn Children's Aid Soc., 284 N. Y.
408, 31 N. E. 2d 506 (1940); Re Cusimano, 174 Misc. 1068, 22 N. Y. S. 2d
N. Y. S. 2d 677 (1940); Tex.: Thompson v. Smith, 248 S. W. 1070 (Tex.,
1923); Wash.: Wright v. Johanson, 132 Wash. 682, 233 P. 16 (1925).
21 Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 84 Ohio St. 424, 95 N. E. 913, Ann. Cas. 1912 C.
737 (1911); High Point Casket Co. v. Wheeler, 182 N. C. 459, 109 S. E. 378,
19 A. L. R. 391 (1921); Clayton v. Martin, 108 W. Va. 571, 151 S. E. 855, citing
R. C. L. (1930).
22 Cameron v. Barancik, 173 Ill. App. 23 (1912); Herbits v. Constitution
Indem. Co. of Philadelphia, 279 Mass. 539, 181 N. E. 723 (1932); Tauro v.
Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. Ltd., 8 N. E. 2d 773 (1937); Hansen v.
Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831 (D. C. Minn. 5th Div. 1960).
23 Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N. W. 2d 41
(1951).
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held that the defendant's actions in obtaining an independent
settlement were privileged, though accomplished by inducing
the injured parties to discharge counsel. This court, adhering to
the common law rule that interference must be unlawful in
character in order to sustain an action, reasoned that since the
injured parties had the right to settle their claims, the defendant
was privileged in interfering with the attorney-client contract.
The fact that the privilege was exercised without proper motive
did not make the conduct actionable. In Hansen v. Barrett, 4 a
federal district court recently held that even though an attorney
is deprived of his prospective fee, interference with an attorney-
client relation by the opposing party who settles the claim is
justified and hence not actionable.
The right of an insurance company to make a direct settle-
ment with the injured party is considered to be an absolute right.
Courts have continually held that no liability for breach of con-
tract exists where the breach is caused by the exercise of an
absolute right.25 If, however, the means used to exercise this
right be unlawful, the privilege of interfering is thereby lost.
The courts have laid particular stress on the four elements
requisite for establishing a cause of action. This is particularly
true with respect to proving that the contract has in fact been
breached and that the defendant's act was the proximate cause
of that breach. Quite often recovery has been denied the at-
torney on the grounds that the facts did not warrant the con-
clusion that the attorney-client contract had been breached.2 6
In Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co. of Philadelphia,7 the
court held that merely intentionally causing the loss of benefits
or profits under a contract is not in itself actionable. To consti-
tute a legal wrong there must be, in addition, either ill will, or
purpose to harm, or the lack of legal justification. The court also
held that a defendant acting in the exercise of an equal or
superior right which comes into conflict with the right of an at-
torney under his attorney-client contract may lawfully interfere
with such right.
24 Hansen v. Barrett, supra note 22.
25 An act which a person has a definite legal right to do without qualifica-
tions. Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa. 402, 25 A. 2d 820 (1942); Orr v. Mutual Ben.
Health & Acc. Ass'n., 240 Mo. App. 236, 207 S. W. 2d 511 (1947).
26 Cameron v. Barancik, supra note 22; Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co.
of Philadelphia, supra note 22; Wahl v. Strous, supra note 25; Barnes v.
Quigley, 49 A. 2d 467 (D. C. Mun. App. 1946); Orr v. Mutual Ben. Health
& Acc. Ass'n., supra note 25.
27 Herbits v. Constitution Indem. Co. of Philadelphia, supra note 22.
Jan., 1961
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
INSURANCE COMPANY INTERFERENCE
An attorney may not prohibit the client from making a di-
rect settlement with the opposing party. The courts have held
that such a provision in an attorney-client contract would be
void as against public policy.2 8 If there is no way to prevent the
client from making a direct settlement with the opposing party,
it follows that the procurement of such settlement is within the
client's rights. It can also be concluded that the defendant who
induced the client to make the settlement committed no legal
wrong against the attorney.
In Klauder v. Cregar,'9 a widow, whose husband had been
killed by an automobile driven by the defendant and insured by
an automobile liability insurance company, decided to bring
action. She retained counsel and executed a power of attorney
to him whereby he was to receive fifty per cent of any sum re-
covered either by way of suit or settlement. The widow retained
the right to settle with the joint tortfeasors. During the pendency
of the action one of the defendant's adjusters induced the widow
to settle for a sum of $5000, by informing her that the power
of attorney executed with her counsel was no good, that if she
settled out of court she would not have to pay her attorney, and,
that the insurance company would take care of her attorney.
The widow's counsel, not being paid, brought suit against the
insurance company for wrongful interference with his contrac-
tual rights. The court held that the actions of the insurance
company constituted a wrongful inducement of a breach of con-
tract, committed with knowledge of the innocent parties' con-
tract rights, and that such action could not be justified on the
ground that they enhanced the tortfeasor's business interests.
A New York court held that the act of an insurance com-
pany, whose adjuster induced the injured party to settle by
threatening that no compensation would be paid unless the in-
jured party breached the contract of retainer with his attorney,
was unjustified.30 The court also said that the mere fact that
the attorney had a cause of action against his client did not
exonerate the parties who wrongfully induced the breach of
contract.3 1
Under Pennsylvania law an attorney retained on a contingent
fee basis has an interest in the contract apart from his mere
28 Krause v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 23.
29 Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 A. 667 (1937).
30 Lurie v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 270 N. Y. 379, 1 N. E. 2d 472 (1936).
31 Supra note 30.
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employment. The attorney has a cause of action against a third
party who induces a breach of such contract, and may recover
his full contingent fee.32 The fact that the attorney may have a
cause of action against his client for breach of contract does not
preclude his bringing an action against the party who induced
that breach, knowing of the existence of the contract and the
rights of the parties thereunder.33 If the third party induces the
client to make a separate settlement, for the purpose of depriv-
ing his attorney of his contingent fee, and the client is otherwise
insolvent, an action may be maintained against the inducer.
34
The courts have consistently held that an attorney may not
be "bilked" out of his fee through actions of a third party in
conspiracy with the attorney's client.35 In such cases the third
party loses any privileged immunity he might have had.
In Ohio-3 an injured party retained counsel under a con-
tingent fee contract. The defendant had knowledge of this con-
tract but persuaded the injured party to settle by conspiring with
him to deprive the attorney of his fee. The court allowed the
attorney to recover and in their syllabus said:
Where the defendant in a tort action settles with the
plaintiff behind the back of the attorney who had con-
tracted to prosecute the action for a contingent fee and the
settlement is made with full knowledge on the part of the de-
fendant of such contract, an action lies by the attorney
against the defendant for his full share of the settlement
as provided in his contract.37
It has also been held that if the client was induced to dis-
charge her attorney and employ one selected by the insurer,
the attorney may recover.38 The attorney may also bring action
where the judgment was sold to the defendants, thus making
it impossible for the attorney to perform his contract.
39
32 Bennett v. Sinclair Nav. Co., 33 F. Supp. 14 (D. C. Pa. 1940).
33 Supra note 32.
34 Gordon v. Mankoff, 146 Misc. 258, 261 N. Y. S. 888 (1931).
For other recent examples of insurance adjusters' misconduct, see
Parker v. United Tank Truck Rental, Inc., 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 246 (1960);
Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith, 166 N. E. 2d 341 (Ind. App. 1960),
aff'g. 126 Ind. App. 332, 133 N. E. 2d 72.
35 Gordon v. Mankoff, supra note 28; Barnes v. Quigley, supra note 26.
36 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Godfrey, 28 Ohio L. R. 598 (1928).
37 Supra note 36.
38 Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F. 2d 547 (CA 10, 1955).
39 Hogue v. Sparks, supra note 12.
Jan., 1961
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In Ohio the rights of an attorney retained on a contingent
fee basis are protected. In Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, 0 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that where the attorney-client relation is
terminated by the client without cause, a cause of action for
breach of contract accrues immediately in favor of the attorney.
The holding of the Scheinesohn case was reaffirmed and extended
in the case of Roberts v. Montgomery, 1 which held that if the
injured party makes a direct settlement with the wrongdoer,
while his counsel in good faith and without delay or default is
carrying out the obligations of the contingent fee contract, the
percentage of the settlement money designated as compensation
in the contract belongs to the attorney. The court's rationale was
that it ought to prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of the
attorney.
Conclusion
The cloak of immunity that the insurance companies wear,
and the fact that recently a trend has been noticed encouraging
settlements,42 results in attorneys, finding their just fees di-
minished by the interference of third persons not in privity with
the attorney-client contract, being compelled to find other means
of redressing the wrongs thus perpetrated against them.
40 Scheinesohn v. Lemonek, supra note 20.
41 Roberts v. Montgomery, supra note 20.
42 "Juries get stingy in awarding money." The Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Oct. 5, 1960, p. 1.
Note, however, that there undoubtedly is some merit in the insurance
company complaints of interference in their business. Thus, the current
investigations of ambulance chasing in Brooklyn, N. Y. recently revealed
an organized ring of fraudulent claim specialists involving doctors, lawyers,
insurance claims men and adjusters, garage mechanics, etc. Similar rings
recently were uncovered in Akron, Ohio. See, N. Y. Times, p. 32 (Nov. 16,
1960); Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. 11 (July 14, 1960); 5 Negl. & Comp. Serv-
ice (23) 177 (Sept. 1, 1960); 5 Id. (22) 173 (Aug. 15, 1960). Nevertheless,
the insurance companies can rely on criminal proceedings, and bar associa-
tion disciplinary proceedings to punish false claimants. Attorneys have no
equivalent aid against insurance company interference.
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol10/iss1/7
